Mansions on the bill?

As regular readers know, On London is always on guard against attempts to divert more funding from London, already a major net contributor to UK taxes, to the rest of the country. Other regions need investment for sure, but London’s golden eggs are in limited supply. The capital’s problems, which include the highest regional poverty rates after housing costs, cannot be ignored.

But it’s hard to deny that Rachel Reeves had a point when she observed in her budget speech that a “Band D home in Darlington or Blackpool pays just under £2,400 in Council Tax…nearly £300 more than a £10 million mansion in Mayfair”.

You can decry the pointing at Mayfair when several London boroughs charge more in Counci Tax than Darlington or Blackpool. You can point out the historic reasons for the imbalance, from the tax’s origins as a post-Poll Tax hybrid of service charge and tax, to outdated valuations and variable price changes since 1991, to the relative performances of councils in different parts of the country. You can highlight the way that other local taxes, such as Business Rates, are raised in London and distributed across the country. But even so, the disparity doesn’t look fair.

The Chancellor’s solution is a new “mansion tax” – or “high value council tax surcharge” to use its full and slightly misleading title – which will be imposed on properties valued at over £2 million. It will be introduced from April 2028 – like other tax rises, kicked towards what Reeves must hope will be sunnier uplands two years hence. Treasury calculations estimate the tax will raise £400 million by 2029/30.

The “mansion tax” will clearly hit London (and the South East) harder than other English regions, but it is hard to work out precisely how much harder. The most recent comprehensive valuation of properties, which forms the basis of Council Tax bands today, was made 35 years ago. Property price changes have diverged wildly since then, so it doesn’t tell us much about current values.

One possible proxy would be looking at prices actually paid for properties. Such data is collected and published by the Land Registry. This is probably as good as anything else in the public domain, but still pretty flawed. For one thing, we cannot assume that the values of properties sold in any given year reflect the values of those that are not. There may be more high value properties than show up in the sales figures, as these have proved toughest to sell in recent years. Or, there may be fewer, as prices have dropped for this very reason (particularly in “prime” London).

Still…In 2024, around 2,600 properties in London were registered as sold for over £2 million, representing around two thirds of all sold at that level in England. Almost half of these sales were in Kensington & Chelsea, Camden, Westminster and the City of London. Properties in London were also far more likely to be sold for the highest prices: 0.5 per cent of all sales in London were for more than £5 million compared to 0.01 per cent of all such sales in the rest of England.

Extrapolating those ratios to estimate (very roughly) the impact of the measures, it looks like around 100,000 of London’s three million non-socially rented dwellings (3.3 per cent) might be liable to the tax, compared to around 40,000 of the 19 million in the rest of England (0.2 per cent). In total, Londoners could pay just over 75 per cent of an indicative mansion tax yield of £525 million.

This is a higher total figure than that estimated by the Treasury, which has no doubt modelled non-payment, price changes and various valuation finagles, but it is not that far off. My workings can be seen below.

Screenshot 2025 11 27 at 13.30.18

So, Londoners will be paying the bulk of this new tax, and that will include many who feel very far from “wealthy”. But it won’t go to London. Though it is called a “council tax surcharge”, the tax has nothing to do with Council Tax: funds raised will go straight into national coffers, bypassing even a nominal allocation to local authorities (who would likely lose any gain in adjusted government grant allocations). In the words of the LSE’s Professor Tony Travers, “It’s a central government tax. Pure and simple”.

London’s net fiscal transfer will creep up from the £43 billion that went from the capital to other parts of the UK in 2022/23, and accountability will become ever more confused. The Local Government Association has already highlighted the risk that councils are regarded as accountable for a charge that they do not control or spend, and have asked that the funding raised is allocated to local authority services.

There may be significant practical difficulties in implementation too. There have been revaluations since 1991: the Valuation Office undertook one of Wales’ 1.5 million homes in 2003, and is planning another by 2028, using sales data and automated valuation to develop a more sophisticated approach to determining values.

But it’s not going to be easy. As a signal of complexity, it is worth noting that the Welsh revaluation has been postponed from this year. Furthermore, people living in houses valued at over £2 million include many who have tax advisors, chartered surveyors and lawyers on speed dial.

Experts such as Paul Johnson, Dan Neidle and Neal Hudson have also observed that the system is a throwback to the “slab” system of Stamp Duty Land Tax that was phased out in 2016, and led to sale values clustering just below the points where higher rates would kick in. April 2028 suddenly seems a lot closer.

More fundamentally, this is a clunky half measure. There is a strong case for a comprehensive reform, to fully revalue and re-band properties for Council Tax, or to go further and replace Council Tax and Stamp Duty with new property or land value taxes, using innovative valuation techniques to create a more transparent, responsive and proportionate system.

The mansion tax is not that comprehensive reform. Instead, the risk is that this measure, like Inheritance Tax hikes on owners of farmland and family businesses, annoys an influential and vocal minority, without raising huge sums.

And it will leave the core machinery of Council Tax, with its 20th Century valuations, its restrictive banding model, and its proliferating surcharges and discounts, looking increasingly dusty and dilapidated – like an unloved and barely functional household appliance that everybody hates but nobody can quite bring themselves to replace.

First published by On London

Housing in London – every cloud has a cloudy lining

There’s a German word, “dunkelflaute”, which translates as “dark doldrums” – periods when there is no wind or sun to generate electricity (making you reliant on coal and Russian gas, if you happen to have shut down all your nuclear power plants). London’s housing market seems to be facing dark doldrums at the moment: prices are stuck in a rut, residential planning permissions are at half the level they were five years ago, and transaction volumes and new building have slowed to a crawl.

Property prices in London shot up after the financial crisis, but have risen far less dramatically since 2016, as a result, property analyst Neal Hudson suggests, of tougher regulation of residential mortgages and more taxation of property investment. The market boomed briefly from 2020 to 2022, but has fallen back since then. According to the Nationwide Building Society’s index, average prices were ten per cent higher in 2024 than eight years earlier, but that is a 15 per cent fall once inflation is taken into account.

After decades of soaring prices, surely cheaper housing is good news for somebody? The Nationwide data show that the average price paid by a first-time buyer in London is now less than nine times median earnings, the lowest ratio for ten years. Rental affordability also seems to be improving, with government figures showing average rents taking up around 40 per cent of median income of renting households in 2022/23, compared to 57 per cent in 2016/17.

But neither of these figures tells the whole story. To paraphrase Withnail, living in London is becoming cheaper for those who can afford it, but remains prohibitively expensive to those who can’t.

Cheaper houses are only cheaper if you don’t need to borrow money. For first-time buyers, rising interest rates have gobbled up any savings from price falls: in 2020-22 Nationwide calculated that mortgage payments accounted for around 50 per cent of first-time buyers’ take-home pay.

Rising interest rates pushed that up to 66 per cent at the end of last year, though it has fallen back to around 60 per cent since then (a similar level to 2016). And, even with lower prices, London buyers still need to find deposits of £110,000 – a gargantuan sum for anyone without blockbuster bonuses, access to the Bank of Mum and Dad, or at least somewhere to live rent-free (and possibly holiday and fun-free too) while they scrimp and save.

As Paul Johnson of the Institute for Fiscal Studies recently observed, this means that anyone without wealthy parents or somewhere to stay rent-free will find it much more difficult to move into their own property in London and to enjoy everything the capital offers.

This might not matter if the Levelling Up dream of excellent jobs everywhere had been realised. But it hasn’t, and London should be able to offer opportunities for all, not just those lucky enough to have been born within the M25.

Apparent improvements in rental affordability also obscure a less positive reality. Government figures show that between 2016/17 and 2022/23, rents fell from 57 to 40 per cent of household income for people renting. But for someone earning median wages in London, rent fell from 59 per cent to 53 per cent of gross earnings over the same period – a significant drop, but much smaller than that implied by the official figures.

Why have renters’ household incomes increased faster than median wages? It could be a result of an increasing number of renting households having more than one earner, or maybe lower earners being squeezed out of the private rental market altogether.

Every cloud has a cloudy lining. If stagnant house prices are not doing much for renters or first-time buyers, they are doing even less for housebuilding. In 2023/24, around 32,000 dwellings were added to London’s housing stock, the lowest level since 2014/15, when the city was still emerging from the financial crisis. These include conversions and changes of use (including the dwindling number of office-to-residential conversions). And only 33,000 new residential units were given planning permission in 2023/24 – way below the peak of 80,000 plus each year between 2014/15 and 2018/19.

When prices fall, housebuilding slows, almost as a thermostatic reaction. Developers base their business plans on a range of projections, including changes in house prices and build costs. If prices go up faster than costs, building goes ahead. But in a stagnant market with high construction inflation, plans are paused or slow-pedalled.

After the financial crisis, housing associations were able to take up some of the slack, completing an average 7,000 homes each year in the five years from 2008/09. But their output in the past five years has been half that, as the need to fund safety improvements and squeezed grant levels have reduced capacity. Local authorities have started building more, completing 3,000 units in the past two years alone, but there is still a gap.

The dark doldrums cannot last forever. Interest rates are forecast to fall next year (if not as fast as previously predicted), which may help more first-time buyers to take advantage of lower prices. In addition, while provisional figures for housing starts in 2023/24 are the lowest since 2020/21, construction economist Noble Francis has observed that brick deliveries, a good leading indicator for housebuilding activity, were 21 per cent higher in October than a year earlier.

There is also Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner’s shake-up of planning, heavily trailed in interviews and newspaper pieces last weekend. Will this be enough to treble London’s house building rate in order to achieve its 80,000 homes a year target? What other changes might be needed? Watch this space.

First published by OnLondon.